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Book Reviews 
Jandl, Thomas (2013), Vietnam in the Global Economy – The Dy-
namics of Integration, Decentralization and Contested Politics
Plymouth: Lexington Books, ISBN 978-0-7391-7786-0, 312 pages 
I found this book very hard to review as its methodology is highly unor-
thodox. It is developed from a PhD thesis defended at an American 
University. As such, one would expect it to follow standard rules of 
research at that level: respect for, and awareness of, situations where its 
views are contentious; respect for facts; and an awareness of the specific-
ity of its theoretical positions. All of these are, however, lacking.  
Any student of Vietnam studies knows that there is a considerable 
extant literature on the history of the country since reunification in 
1975–1976 that discusses her politics, policy histories, social change and 
so on. This literature is often rather solipsistic, lacking reference to expe-
riences elsewhere, yet it exists and is surprisingly large. It contains a se-
ries of important debates and differences. Jandl makes no attempt to 
survey this literature, nor to situate his own views within it, and so to 
better contribute to it. This is a pity.  
Jandl’s main thesis is that much can be learnt about Vietnam from 
examining the incentive structures that influenced important choices, 
such as investments and patterns of governance, especially those at pro-
vincial level. He sees incentive structures as importantly influenced by 
governance, and is concerned to argue that good governance, when it 
happens, in part comes because local officials avoid rent-seeking behav-
iour and benefit from this by securing better outcomes locally as higher 
investment supports growth, better workers’ incomes, better public ser-
vices and so on. He marshals data to try to show that this is often the 
case, and treats this as evidence for “harmony of interest” between rulers 
and ruled.  
This is a familiar metaphor, arguing that private capital and a poli-
tics that is not really democratic can interact to generate good results for 
the mass of the population.  
For Vietnam, this line of argument owes much to Malesky’s work in 
the early/mid 2000s, which fed into his construction of the Provincial 
Competitiveness Index (PCI), which was funded by aid donors. The 
central point of this is the presence of a positive correlation between 
variations in levels of foreign investment by province or city and varia-
tions in the PCI. The PCI is a composite index made up of a series of 
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sub-components that are weighted together. This means that how it 
moves depends upon how this happens arithmetically. It is taken by 
Jandl to be a proxy for good governance. As such, the PCI needed to 
have been deconstructed to see how it was made up and how the proxy 
variable worked in empirical terms. This is qualitative research method-
ology ‘101’, and Jandl does not do this. There is a discussion in Chapter 
4 of the elements of the PCI, but there is no analysis that I can see of 
how the arbitrary weights used and the particular settings of the PCI’s 
sub-indices influence how it moves. This is crucial to judging its value as 
a proxy.  
Jandl’s argument pivots on a range of devices, such as the view that 
much of Vietnam’s post war history is best written as about the factors 
that influence policy, which of course assumes much: that policy matters, 
a lot; that policy is decided through relatively rational processes; and that 
policy outcomes, measured through devices such as Provincial Competi-
tiveness Index, are well-known and cause–effect relationships between 
policy and outcomes well-established. Much of this is contentious, and 
given that much of what he states appears as assertion. And much of this 
argument is to do with just where the Doi Moi ideology of the 1986 VIth 
Party Congress came from, and how and why. Anybody familiar with the 
Vietnam studies literature, or indeed who has argued with a well-
informed Vietnamese, should be well aware of the histories that argue 
contrarily that much happened to support market development before 
1986, that much of this was not policy-driven, and that there is no per-
suasive simple “policy drives change” rationale to what was happening. 
Jandl does not mention any of this.  
Since I myself disagree with Jandl this situation is more than a little 
difficult to manage in a review. Many statements made are challengeable. 
This should have been picked up by his supervisors, his examiners or the 
publisher’s reviewers. Naturally, therefore, I will try to curb my retorts 
and interjections and look to the footnotes and sourcing to see whether 
‘his sources are better’. But usually I find no such sources. For example, 
the reactive policies towards the commercialisation of the state sector 
that happened before 1986 can be tracked through the Official Gazette 
(the Cong Bao). The introductions to these Decrees are very informative. 
There is no mention of such sources. Chapter 3 is entitled ‘From roving 
to stationary bandit – a history’. Its 19 footnotes contain 6 references, all 
of them singular and there is no discussion of alternative positions. 
Footnote no. 1 states that “Profit-loss accounting, for example, was not 
practiced in Vietnam prior to doi moi, and accountants had to be brought 
in from abroad or trained from scratch” (78). No source is given. Stand-
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ard Soviet accounting produced profit and loss statements, under differ-
ent names. Any reading of the Soviet literature on SOE (State Owned 
Enterprise) management would tell this story. I think that by 1986 many 
SOE managers had already acquired considerable experience managing 
commercial profit and loss information through their commercial activi-
ties. I can source this through references. Jandl gives no reference for his 
contrary assertion. Most of his footnotes simply support assertions made 
in the main text, without adding sources to support the position he takes.  
We are told (119) that “Vietnam followed the Chinese model in ini-
tially limiting economic reforms to a small part of the country, in Vi-
etnam’s case to Ho Chi Minh City”. The policy record as I know it does 
not show this, and there is more to policy than simply the allocation of 
investment licenses (120). Indeed, Jandl’s own account shows how sig-
nificant investment went to Hanoi and Haiphong, like Ho Chi Minh City 
possessing significant ‘voice’ in Hanoi’s corridors of power. The ques-
tion as to whether, under corrupt conditions, allocation of investment 
licenses reflects ‘policy’, is also contentious. A similar stance towards 
belief in policy as a key explanatory factor can be found throughout the 
book. For example, “Ho Chi Minh City’s government has a vision of 
how to maintain the attractiveness of the province” (187). One could 
argue that this vision may be articulated, but in reality takes second prior-
ity to maintaining corrupt earnings, as education policy shows clearly.  
We read that “[…] China serves as Vietnam’s reform model” (227). 
There are citable published studies (not by me) that strongly disagree 
with this point. They are not cited.  
Data issues are also rather worrying. On page 236 we read that Le 
Duan was Party General Secretary from 1986 to 1991 and was a North-
erner and a Doi Moi leader. He was from central Vietnam and died in 
1986 before the 1986 VIth Party Congress. Again, this should have been 
picked up by supervisors, examiners and publisher’s reviewers.  
Apart from issues of data, Jandl’s theoretical position is also conten-
tious, though he does not engage with alternatives. Thus he states on 
page 98 “Rent-seeking is always a disincentive to invest in a jurisdiction”. 
One could argue that the presence of large rents, created in some way or 
another, increases incentives to invest, and could point to the high levels 
of investments of human capital in modern financial centres, to the state 
of the US economy during the robber-baron periods … and so on. In-
deed Jandl pays very little attention to the possibility of rent-creation as a 
way to create incentives to attract investors, such as through investments 
in public goods production, infrastructure etc. In technical economic 
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terms, these also create “profits that cannot be competed away” and are 
therefore rents.  
This book is mainly of interest for what it tells us about its own 
provenance. Its arguments are driven by provincial thinking that is as 
certain of its own validity as it is unaware of its own limitations, and 
cannot be bothered to accept the challenges that come from going out 
into the wide world outside its own borders. The book is driven by the 
need to preserve the idea that policy, based upon beliefs and analyses of 
which it is itself an example, can, should and does drive change. To make 
these arguments, it ignores the basic rules of scholarship, which are to 
locate one’s arguments in the wider field of which they are part, a prob-
lem that much of the Vietnam studies literature faces, to be careful with 
facts, and to discuss other theories than those of one’s professors. This is 
to be somewhat charitable. Jandl writes on page 265 that “Vietnam initi-
ated its reforms out of rational considerations”. A better argument is that 
the Vietnamese and their politics managed to cope with a transition from 
plan to market, and then failed to cope with the issues that arose as the 
market evolved into a form of capitalism. Politics is not political science.  
A final observation is to ask what value is being added here by the 
publisher. Under today’s conditions, where it is possible for scholars like 
Jandl and myself to distribute work directly, to self-publish, why use a 
publisher? Marketing is easy, and the potential audience is not large. The 
valid reason is because a publisher, through their review process, endors-
es the value of the text. The invalid reason is because it is necessary ‘to 
publish’ for an academic career. The endorsement function is valuable if 
done properly. There is food for thought here.  
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